Deposit insurance has probably been the most criticized government policy related to hank and S&,L failures. Many economists believe that to take excessive risks, thereby increasing their chance of failing. ' This article investigates empirically the connection between deposit insurance and bank failure. Today, virtually all banks are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and, consequently, isolating the effects of insurance from other regulations and exogenous economic conditions that affect bank performance is difficult. We study the effects of deposit insurance by drawing on historical evidence from a voluntary insurance regime that operated in Kansas between 1909 and 1929. Because membership in the Kansas deposit insurance system was optional, we are able to compare insured arid uninsured banks facing otherwise similar regulations and economic conditions in a way not possible with modern data. We estimate a model of bank failure to test for the impact of insurance on the likelihood of failure.
2 We find that insured banks were less well capitalized and, in some years, less liquid 1 f(ane (1989) examines the problems of the S&L industry and the role of government policy. Mishkin (1992) , Keeley (1990) and O'Driscoll (1988) discuss the relationship between deposit insurance and bank failures in the 1980s. 2 Wheelock (l992b) also investigates how deposit insurance affected the probability of failure for Kansas banks in this era, but employs a different methodology and somewhat different data. Wheelock and Wilson (1993) use the same data set as the present study, but while considering the effects of insurance, focus largely on whether or not measures of managerial inefficiency help distinguish failing from surviving banks. Grossman (1992) also investigates the than uninsu red banks, and that capitalization and liquidity wer'e important determinants of failure.
The next section discusses how deposit insurance might increase the likelihood of bank failure. Next, we describe the Kansas deposit insurance system and the effects of a collapse of commodity i~cr~in 1920 on commercial banks. The final sections develop the econometric methodology used to model failure, specify the model, and present results and conclusions.
LJi:~POS~.11.1 L\JS 1 .14.±%NCE A.NL) Bi%)N .1 RE Federal deposit insurance was enacted in response to the bank failures of the Great Depression. Thousands of banks failed from 1930 to 1933, wiping out the funds of depositors, producing a collapse of the money supply, increasing the costs of intermediation and interfering with the clearing of payments.' Although large banks and many economists vigorously opposed deposit insurance, and President Franklin Roosevelt was reluctant to accept it, Congress deemed deposit insurance necessary to protect small, unsophisticated depositors from losses clue to bank failures, and the payments system from a wholesale banking collapse like that of 1930-33.' Until the 1980s, deposit insurance was generally hailed for eliminating the possibility of widespread bank failures? Merton (1977) and Kareken and Wallace (1978) showed, however, that when insurance premiums are unrelated to the expected cost of failure to the insurance system, banks have an incentive to take greater risks than they otherwise would. Because depositors are protected in the event of bank failure (to the limit of insurance coverage), they have little or no incentive to monitor their banks' activities or to demand risk plemiums on deposit intei'est rates. Deposit insurance thus raises the expected return to banks from investing in risky loans and investments and encourages them to substitute debt, in the form of insured deposits, for equity. Consequently, unless regulations inhibit risk-taking, the presence of deposit insurance could lead to more hank and S&,l failures than there would otherwise he.
Many economists blame deposit insurance, coupled with inadequate regulation and supervision, political interference and a failure by regulators to promptly close insolverif institutions, for the high number of S&L failures and bankruptcy of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation during the 1980s."'l'he banking industry's problems were, by comparison, less notorious. Banks faced higher capital requirements and were more stringently supervised than S&Ls, which lessened banks' incentive and ability to take excessive risks. But deregulation of deposit interest rates, initiated by the Depository Institutions Deregula lion and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, the gradual removal of barriers to branch banking, more liberal chartering polices and increased competition from foreign banks and from nonhank financial institutions, all worked to lessen charter values and increase the incentive for banks (as well as S&-,Ls) to take greater risks.~More-over in 1980, deposit insurance coverage was increased from 540,000 per account to $100,000 for both banks and S&,l~s,while the failure resolution policy known as "too-hig-to-lail'' effectively extended insurance to all deposits at the lam-gust banks, thereby enhancing their incentive to take risks. 2
As is all too often the case, the bank and thrift debacle of the 1 980s stemmed in part from the failure of policy makers to heed lessons from the past. Flood (1992) argues that when deposit insum-ance legislation was being considered in 1933, policy makers understood the temptation that insurance gives hankers to take excessive risks. Accordingly, coverage was 3 Studies of the causes and effects of bank failures during 7 Keeley (1990) draws the connection between increased the Depression are too numerous to list. Friedman and competition, deposit insurance and increased risk-taking. Schwartz (1963) , however, is the seminal investigation of tm Too-big-to-fail was implemented to reduce the possibility the impact of bank failures on the money supply, and Berthat the failure of a very large bank could produce a sysnanke (1983) is the most important investigation of nontemic crisis, with depositor runs on many banks. Mishkin monetary effects of bank failures. (1992) and Boyd and Gertler (1993) argue that this policy 4 Golembe (1960) and Flood (1992) investigate the rationale increased risk-taking by very large banks.
for federal deposit insurance. 5 For example, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 434-42) .°F orexample, see Kane (1989) . iZFfl2ZO .di royr 5Zi0t~1t< 22Z ST limited to $2,000 per account and regulations were imposed to constrain risk-taking. Deposit interest rate ceilings prevented weak institutions from growing rapidly by bidding up intem-est rates, and regulators gave bankers added incentive to act conservatively by limiting the issuance of new bank charters. Many of the sources of increased competition for-banks and S&Ls that had emerged by 1980, such as money market mutual funds and the commercial paper market, were the product of technological changes that could not be foreseen in 1933.' But deregulation of bank and S&L deposits and the expansion of deposit insurance coverage at a time when the industry was facing increased competition contradicted the regulatory principle that underlay deposit insurance legislation in 1933.
The insights that policy mnakers had in 1933 about deposit insurance came partly from prior state experiences with deposit insurance. Six states had experimented with insurance in the pre-Civil War era, as did eight others between 1908 and 1930." None of the 20th-century systems was able to fully protect depositors of failed banks from loss, and each closed before the onset of the Great Depression. The commodity-price collapse of 1920-21 triggered a wave of bank failures throughout the Midwest and the South, including seven of the eight states with deposit insurance. Although loan losses associated with the decline of state incomes was the proximate cause of bank failures, insured banks generally suffered higher failure rates than uninsured banks facing similar exogenous conditions." Contemporaries believed that deposit insurance had contributed to the high number of failures because it protected incompetent and dishonest bankers from market discipline. 12 In the following sections, we investigate empirically how deposit insurance might have contributed to the failure of banks operating under the deposit insurance system of Kansas during the 1920s. We study this case because just three of the eight state insurance systems had optional membership for state-chartered banks and, hence, permit comparison of insured and uninsured banks facing otherwise similar' conditions. Of these, only the Kansas system lasted for many years with a large number of banks electing to join the system and a significant number remaining uninsured.
• (1993) . '°The20th-century stales and the years in which their insurance systems operated are Oklahoma , Texas , Kansas (1909-29) , Nebraska , South Dakota (1909 -31), North Dakota (1917 -29), Washington (1917 and Mississippi (1914.30) . Cooke (1909) , Robb (1921 ), American Bankers Association (1933 Deposit Insurance Corporation (1956) and Calomiris (1989) compare the features and performance of the systems. "Thies and Gerlowski (1989) and Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1994) find that a state's bank failure rate during the 1920s was higher if it had a system of deposit insurance, holding constant other possible causes of failure. Wheelock (1992a) reports similar evidence at the county level for Kansas. "Commenting about the effects of the Kansas deposit insurance system, Harger (1926, p. 278) Kansas banks were required to operate for at least one year and undergo an examination by state authorities before being admitted into the insurance system.'" Insured banks were also required to maintain total capital of at least 10 percent of total deposits, and surplus and undistrthuted profits of at least 10 percent of total capital. '~At first, deposit insurance was restricted to noninterest hearing accounts, savings deposits of $100 or less, and time deposits of between six and 12 months maturity. Banks with insured deposits were not permitted to pay more than 3 percent interest on any deposit) whether insured or not." Regulations were relaxed in 1911; insurance was extended to all deposits riot otherwise secured, including savings accounts in excess of $100, and the state banking commissioner was given authority to adjust interest rate ceilings as lie deemed appropriate.
Insured banks were assessed annual premiums equal to 1/20 of 1 percent of their insured deposits less total bank capital. Although a bank could reduce its preniium by increasing its capital, the saving was small. A bank with $100,000 of insured deposits and $10,000 of capital v'/a5 assessed an insurance prerruum of $45, whereas a bank with 515,00(1 of capital had a premium of $42.50. Additional premiums could be assessed to cover shortfalls in the insurance fund, hut total annual premiums were capped at 1/4 of 1 percent of insured deposits less capital. Banks also were required to place cash or eligible bonds with the state banking commissioner equal to 0.5 percent ($500 minimum) of their insured deposits to guarantee insurance premium payment. Banks could withdraw from the insurance system at any time, but remained liable for any premiums needed to reimburse depositors of banks which failed while the withdrawing hank was insured, including the six months following not ice of withdrawalDeposit insurance proved pop~tlai'in Kansas, and before 1920 the deposits of insured banks grew more rapidly than those of uninsured state and national banks. Figure 1 plots the participation rate of all Kansas banks and of those eligible for deposit insurance. Figure 2 illustrates the sham-es of all bank and eligible hank deposits held by insured banks.'' The percentage of the state's hank deposits held by insured banks peaked in 1921 at 43.8 percent and membership in the system peaked at 65.6 percent of eligible banks in 1923. In that year, 681 banks, holding $168 million of deposits, belonged to the insurance system, while 357 state banks, holding $64 million of deposits, did not.
TEII]1E/ CIIAR.A( FE/RISTICS OF INSt :Jfl T I) B.Ar.xKS
This section identifies some iniportant differences between insured and uninsured banks that may explain why the failure rate of insured banks exceeded that of uninsured banks.
If depositors believe that the~'will he protected from loss in the event of hank failure, the)' will he willing to accept a lower rate of return on their deposits than they would in the absence of such protection. Because it lowers the cost of deposits, deposit insurance encourages hanks to rely more heavily on deposits to finance their activities, as opposed to equity and nondeposit liabilities, than they otherwise would. Economic theory suggests that banks also will choose to hold riskier assets when deposits are insured.20 Insured banks in Kansas had a higher failure rate than uninsured hanks, which might have heen caused by "moral hazard/' that is, by high-risk behavior encouraged by deposit insurance. Alternatively, because risky tianks would stand to gain the most from insurance in terms of Io~verdeposit costs, the "Mississippi, however, ultimately issued bonds to retire the deficit of its insurance system. ' 6 The requirement of one year of operation was waived if no other bank in the applicant's town was an insurance system member. ' 7 The former requirement was eliminated in 1917 , Warburton (1958 argues that, it maintained and enforced, the requirement could have prevented much of the rapid growth of banks that ultimately resulted in large losses to the insurance system. ' tm For comparison, the annual average interest rates on prime four-six month commercial paper and on call loans in 1909 were 4.69 and 2.71 percent. respectively, ' tm All banks include those with federal charters, trust companies and unincorporated banks. The source of these data is the FOIC (1956, p. 68) .
"See Merton (1977) or Kareken and Wallace (1978) . "2S",t,'--.S iciq,t failure rate of insured banks might have been higher simply because risky banks were more likely to loin the voluntary insurance system, that is, because of "adverse selection!' Of course, both effects might have been present and contributed to the higher failure rate of insured banks.
The troubled history of the Kansas deposit insurance system raises the question of whether depositors expected an insurance payoff in the event of bank failure. If they did not, then depositors would have had an incentive to monitor their banks' activities and to demand the same terms from a member of the insurance system as from an uninsured bank with equal likelihood of failure. Indeed, if depositors thought that insumed banks had, on average, a higher probability of failure and that an insurance payoff was unlikely, then they would have had an incentive to transfer deposits from insured banks to uninsured banks. No doubt some depositor-s did so, as the relative share of deposits in insured banks fell after 1921. Large number-s of depositors left their funds in insured banks, however, and because of the difficulty of assessing the extent of protection from deposit insurance at any point in time, might have expected at least partial reimbursement in the event of bank failure.2 To investigate the relationship between deposit insurance and bank behavior, we compare various financial ratios of insured and uninsured banks in our sample in different years. 'lahle 1 reports the mean capital/assets, deposits/assets and cash reserves/deposits ratios of insured and uninsured banks in our sample in each year for which data are available.
22 In general, insured banks maintained less capital relative to assets than uninsured banks and, hence) were more likely to fail as a result of loan losses or other declines in asset values. The hypothesis that the mean capital/assets ratios of insured and uninsured banks are equal can be rejected (at the .10 level or better) in each year.
The greater reliance of insured banks on deposits is indicated by the fact that, except for 1924, insured banks had higher deposits/ assets ratios than uninsured banks. Insured banks also held fewer liquid assets ("reserves"), defined here as cash, cash items and the liabilities of other banks) relative to deposits than uninsured banks in 1910, 1914 and 1924 . Thus, for some of the period, insured banks were less liquid than their uninsured competitors. We find the reserves/deposits ratio to be particularly useful for distinguishing failing and nonfailing banks. The comparatively low capital/assets and reserves/deposits ratios of insured banks indicate that they were more risky than uninsured banks and, hence, the higher failure rate of insured banks is not surprising. We further examine the impact of deposit insurance on the probability of failure, and seek to identify other characteristics which distinguish failing from nonfailing banks in the following sections.
UjJf BA N KI.NG (X)Ii1~LA..PSE(.)F TIlE I 9,ZOs
The number of banks and total bank deposits grew rapidly throughout the United States in the first two decades of the 20th century, especially during the intiationary boom of World War 1. Kansas experienced a 30 percenf increase in the number of banks between 1910 and 1920, when it had 1,096 state-chartered banks, 266 national banks and 18 unincorporated banks (Kansas, 1920, and Bankers Encyclopedia Company, March 1921) . After 1920, the number of banks in the United States fell sharply, especially in the Midwest and the South, where waves of bank failures followed a collapse of commodity prices. Between June 1920 and .lanuary 1921, an index of wholesale commodity pt-ices fell from 167 to 114; by January 1922, it had fallen to 91 (Board of Governors, 1937, p. 174) . Sharply lower incomes left many farmers who had borrowed to " Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1994) argue that before 1926, depositors had a reasonable expectation of an insurance payoff, and show that deposit insurance enabled members of the insurance system to hold lower capital ratios than uninsured banks until that year.
"The biennial reports of the state banking commissioner (Kansas, various years) provide balance sheet data for all state-chartered banks and trust companies on August 31 of each even-numbered year (except 1912 and 1916) .
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUiB The impact of agricultural distress on indix.'idual Kansas banks rel'Iected the portfolio choices the~'had made prior to the collapse and as it unfolded. Between September 1920 and September 1926, 122 state-chartered Kansas banks failed. Of those, 94 had been memhers of the insurance s~stem(a 4.6 percent failure rate) and 28 had not (a 2.3 percent failure rate). B' contrast, just six national banks failed (a 0.8 percent failure rate). Over the life of the insurance system, depositors of just 27 failed hanks recovered the entire amount of their insured deposits, and those of two other banks received 93 and 95 pet-cent of their deposits, respectively (Warhurton, 1938, PP 27-9) . No insurance payments were made to depositors of 88 mnemher banks that failed (F'DIC, 1956, p.58). On average, holders of insured deposits received 53 percent of their funds from liquidation of bank assets and 18 percent from the deposit insurance fund (7 percent of which came from the reorganization of one bank, the American Stale Bank of Wichita). The remainimig 29 percent of insured deposits were never recovered.
The sharp increase in hank failures beginning in 1920 quickly swamped the resources of the Kansas deposit insurance fund. When a member of the Kansas insurance system failed, its depositors were given interest-bearing certificates immnediately upon closure, and received reimbursement only after' the hank's assets had been entirely liquidated. If the proceeds from liquidalion were insufl'icient to reimhurse insured depositors, the insurance system was supposed to make up the difference. Depositors of the two banks that failed before 1920 were eventually fully reimbursed, hut inadequate insurance funds meant that depositors of most banks that failed aftet-1920 were not as fortunate.
Because depositors were not reimbursed until after liquidation of a failed hank's assets, the condition of the fund and the prospect that depositors of failed banks would eventually receive full reimbursement were difficult to determine at any point. The failure in June 1923 of the Amnencan State l3amik of Wichita, the state's largest insured bamik, presented the insur-ance system with its greatest challenge. Eventually, the bank was reorganized with othem' insured banks assuming $1.4 million of the loss and depositors accepting) on average, 40 percent of their deposits in the fottn of stock in the new hank. The event marked a turning point in the history of the Kansas insurance system, however, as the number of banks and the deposits held in insured banks began to decline." Although a special insurance assessment was collected in 1922 and insurance premiums were set at their legal maximums beginmung in 1924, losses from hank failures exceeded insurance system revenues froni 1921 onward. In 1925, the state hank comnmnissioner stopped making paynients omi all insurance claims, and in 1926 a state supreme court decision effectively ended the system. The court decision resulted from the refusal of several banks that had withdrawn from the insurance system to pay additional insurance premiums. The court ruled that banks could withdraw without additional liability hy simply giving up the bonds they had pledged to guarantee premiuni payments. This led mans' banks to withdraw amid, by 1927, insurance system mnembership had fallen to less than 10 percent of eligible banks.
Kansas appears to have suffered many of the problems that have been associated with the hank and SkI. debacle of the 1980s. In the 1980s, many depository institutions, especially insolvent S&Ls, hid up deposit interest rates and grew rapidly 1w issuing deposits through brokcr5." In the 1 920s, some banks appear to have evaded deposit interest rate ceilings in order to gro~vrapidly. In his report for 1922 (Kansas, 1992, p 5), the state hank commissioner also felt it desirable to limit deposit insurance to only the original holder of a deposit, and not to any assignee. Supervision was also reported to have been weak in Kansas, especially during the worst failure years, amid for a time~~state hanking authorities permitted weak and insolvent banks to remain open rather than closing them immediately upon recognition of trouble (Warburton, 1958, p. 19) . Whether any such banks recovered is not known, but the lack of mention in the biennial reports of the state banking commnissioner suggests that, like the attempts at forbearance during the 1980s, the policy was probably not successful.
M(]DEIANG TEkI.Efl6-K1.H 4 1.JRE While many Kansas banks failed during the 1920s, a majority of banks survived the decade. What characteristics distinguish the sum'vivors from the failures? To identify important characteristics of failing banks, we employ an econometric technique that explicitly models timeto-failure. The analysis of duration data is relatively new in economics. Engineers and biomedical scientists have analyzed time-to-failure for electrical and mechanical components of machinery and the survival times of subjects for many years, but economists have only recently begun to apply similar mnodels, primarily in the area of labor economnics with a focus on the duration of spells of unemplovment.25 Although models developed to analyze duration data are sometimes called time-to-failure models, the event of interest need not he characterized as a "failure"; all that is necessary is that the event he well-defined.
Duration models differ from standard discrete choice models (such as probit or logit models) in that duration models use information about how long banks survive in the estimation of the instamitaneous probability of failure for a given set of observations on the independent variables. Parameter estimates thus indicate whether an increase in the value of ami imidividual independent variahle will reduce or extend the expected time until failure occurs. By contrast, discrete choice models typically ignore information about the timning of failures, and provide an estimate only of the probahility of failum'e within a given interval of time. Discrete choice models treat all banks that fail during art interval the same, as they do all surviving banks. Thus, for example, a hamik that fails on the first day of a two-year in-"See Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1994) and Warburton (1958) for additional detail about this failure.
"See Kane (1989) . ' t Kiefer (1988) provides a good introduction to the analysis of duration data; Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Lancaster (1990) provide more advanced treatments of the subject.
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF Si. LOLItB terval is tm'eated the samne as a bank that fails on the last day, and a bank that survives the interval hut fails one day after that period ends is treated the same as a bank that survives an additional 10 years. Dutation models explicitly incorporate such information, and thus yield more efficient parameter estimates." A detailed description of the duration model used in this article is presented in the appendix.
In the present application, we observe the charter date for each hank in our sample. For some banks, we observe a failure date, wliere failure is defined as the date on which the bank was ordered closed by the state banking commissioner. For the remaining banks, no failure date is ohserved if a bank had not failed by the end of our observation period (1928) or if it liquidated voluntarily, merged with another batik or switched to a federal charter. These observatiomis are considet-ed censor-ed; information about these banks is available for part of their lives, but we do not observe them failing. Censoring is common in duration data of all types and must be addressed within the statistical model used to examine the data. Figure 3 illustrates the types of censoring that may occur in duration data. Assume that the intemval over which banks are observed runs from time t, to I,. The horizontal lines in the figure represent the time hetweemi the charter (late and the date of failure for individual hanks. Given the observation period U~,tJ, the observation for Bank A will be both left-amid rightcensored. For this hank, neither the charter date nor the failure date occur within the observation interval. The ohservation for Batik B will he left-censored; the charter (late does miot occur within the observat ion interval, hut the failure dale does. F'or Bank C, both the charter and failure dates occur between 11 atidl t,,and so the observation is uncensored. Finally, the ohservation for Bank D will he right-censored; the charter (late occur-s within the observation imiterval, hut the failure (late occur-s after t 2 .
•F:XPl~zÑN1TORY VARIABLES ANI)
•
RESE./I]ITS
Other researchers have employed hazard and discrete choice models to identify chat-acteristics that distinguish failing and surviving banks in a variety of settimigs. White (1984) , for example, estimates a probit model to distimiguish failing from nonfailing bamiks during the Banking Panic of 1930. Wheelock (1992a) uses a similar model to study Kamisas bank failures between 1920 and 1926. Both studies found that banks were more likely to fail, the lower theim' capital/assets, surplus/loans, honds/assets, reserves/deposits, or deposits/assets ratios." Banks were more likely to fail, the higher their loans/assets ot shorttetni borrowed funds/assets ratios. 28
Many Kansas banks experiemiced significant loan losses following the collapse of agricultural prices and incomes in 1920-21, and banks with low capital/assets ratios were less well-cushioned against declines in the value of their assets. Banks with little cash and other reserve assets were less able to meet deposit withdrawals, and the smaller a bank's reserves/deposits ratio, the more likely it was to close due to illiquidity. Often a lack of cash was the first sign that a bank was in trouble, and would prompt closure by state banking authorities.
Just as a low level of reserves signaled trouble, so too did a heavy reliance on horrowed funds such as rediscounts of loans with otherbanks or with the Fedemal Reserve. Banks that relied heavily on borrowed funds to finance their operations, or that had to resort to hot--rowing because of loan losses or deposit withdrawals, appear to have been relatively more likely to fail.
Loamis are getierally the most risky and least liquid of bank assets, and the loan portfolios of the rural unit banks of Kansas were undoubtedly not well-diver-sified. Accordingly, the higher a bamik's loans/assets ratio, the greater the likelihood that it would fail. Omi the other hand, banks with substantial hond holdings might "While deriving a direct relationship between the parameters of a duration model and a discrete choice model would be difficult, in principle one could integrate the hazard function estimated from a duration model to obtain the probability of failure within a given interval of time. "Surplus refers to paid-in capital beyond the par value of a bank's stock plus undistributed profits. Reserves refer to cash, cash items and the liabilities of other banks. Wheelock (1992h) includes bank size arid a du no my variable indira t big is'he ther or not a hank was a meruber of the state deposit irisurance system as additional explamiatorv vai-iahles. If larger banks wet-c better diversified, or could capture economies of scale, they might have been less likely to fail. Wlieelock found, however no significant relationship between size and failui-e. Deposit insurance, on the other hand, did significantly affect the probability of failure. Even though the capital/assets r-atio and other measures of risk-takitig should reflect whether-or riot a bank had insured deposits, the full impact of insurance may not be captured by observable variables. The deposit insurance dummy variable might reflect the incentive that insurance gives banks to hold riskier loans amid investments than they otherwise would.
Wheelock (I 9921i) did not test fot interaction
effects between deposit insurance and the financial ratios. One might expect, however, that the effect of a change in a financial ratio on the likelihood of failure would depend in part on whet her-or not fhe hank had deposit insurance. I-or example, the depositors of ati insured batik rnight have been less concerned with a decline in the capital/assets ratio of their hank and. hence, less likely to demand a higher deposit inte rest rate than depositors of an uninsured hank. 'l'he scope for risk-taking and, thus, the probability of failure, resulting front a change "The state banking commissioner accepted only U.S. In addition to the independent vam'iables used by Wheelock (1992b) , we include dummny variables for each interval of 1920-22, 1922-24, 1924-26 and 1926-28 to investigate whether the probability of failure differed across periods for a given set of bank attributes. Only two banks in our sample failed before 1920 and, hence, we do not include dummies for those years. In one specification we also include interaction terms of deposit insurance and the financial ratios." 'I'able 2 reports estimates of the failure niodel that include alter-native combinations of explanatom'y variables. In column one, the coefficient omi the capital/assets, bonds/assets and reserves/ deposits ratios indicate that the higher each of these ratios was, the less likely a bank was to fail. Better capitalized hamiks, and those with substatitial bond holdings and sigmuficant reserves, could better absorb the shock of loan losses and deposit withdrawals accomnpanying the agricultut-al downturn in Kansas. Bamiks that had substantial borrowed funds relative to assets had a greater chance of failing while, contrary to expectations, it appears that the higher a bank's loan/assets tatio, the less likely it was to fail. This finding appears due to multicollinearity, however. The loans/assets ratio is highly correlated with the reserves/deposits ratio. If the latter is omitted, as in the specification reported in column two, the sign of the coefficient on the loans/assets ratio is positive, though not statistically significant.
The coefficient on deposit insurance is not statistically significant, suggesting that any effect that insuramice had on the probability of failure is captured by its relationship with the financial ratios also included in the model. If the dummies for the biennial observation intervals are omitted, the coefficient on insurance is larget and statistically significant. It may he that the strain on the portfolios of all banks caused by the collapse of commodity prices over-whelmed the effect of deposit insurance on the unobserved portfolio risk of insured banks, which could explain why the coefficient on insurance is not significant when the time dummies are imicluded. Not surprisingly, for givemi values of the financial ratios, banks were more likely to fail after the collapse of commodity prices and onset of severe agricultural distress in 1920. Finally, none of the coefficients on the interaction tennis of deposit insurance and the financial ratios is statistically significant. Again, it appears that any impact of deposit insurance on the likelihood of failure is captured by differences iti the financial ratios between insured and unimisured banks.
CR15/Cl J /~JQ5
Researchers have blamed federal deposit insurance for contributing to the high numbers of hank amid thrift failures amid large deposit imisurance payoffs since 1980. IJmiless insurance premiums increase proportionately with risk, banks will be encouraged to take gmiaten risks than they otherwise would. This article I)Iesents '°Thesource of our data is Kansas (various years). "We dropped seven banks because of missing data. Others fall out of the panel after failing, closing voluntarily, merging with other banks, on switching to a national charter, "Few state-chartered Kansas banks were members of the Federal Reserve System during this era. None of the failed banks in our sample was a member, and so differences in supervisory agency or regulation. except those pertaining to deposit insurance, cannot explain variation in failure probabilities across banks. 1/:
deposits, large bond holdings relative to their total assets, or that relied little on borrowed fumids, were less likely to fail. In short, conservatively managed bamiks were less likely to fail and, at the sanie time, hamiks that carried deposit insurance were more risky amid, hence, more likely to fail than their uninsured competitor-s. and, hence, is nonparametric. Consequently the model is more flexible than models in which the failure time distrihution is assumed known except perhaps for a few scalar parameters.
Given the hazard specification in equation 9, the corresponding survivor function (which gives the prohabilitv of survival up to time t) may he written as (10) S(t]x,P) = exp [-~A 0 (u) 
e10dv]
For uncensored observations with failure at time i; the conti-ihution to the likelihood is f(T]~);for observations censored at time 1 the contrihution to the likelihood is S (T]x) , that is, the probabilitv of survival until time i: Cox (1972 Cox ( , 1975 suggests a partial-likelihood approach which can be used to estimate the parameters of the hazard function in 9. Assume, for the moment, that no observations at-c censored, and that the observations are ordered by their completed, untied durations such that t < t. C . -< t,. The conditional probability that observation I fails at time i ,, given that ans' of the ii observations could have failed at time 1,, is Ah~,fl) e~1P (11) ->i~,AU,]x,/3) > the equality results from Pe assumption of the proportional hazard in 9,' the baseline hazard )i~(t)cancels out of the expression on the left in ii. The expression in Ii gives the contribution of the first observation to the partial likelihood.
Analogously, the contribution of the jth observation to the partial likelihood is
The partial likelihood is given by the product of the individual contributions and, hence, its log is Andersen and Gill (1982) and Johansen (1983) show that the partial likelihood can he treated as an ordinary likelihood concentrated with respect to A,,. 33
The model represented by equation 12 can he easily adjusted to accommodate censoring in the data. For the data used in this study, each hank i in the sample is observed at .1, different times C L, < ... < I,, with either failure or censoring occurring al time I,,. Note that times here refer not to calendar time, hut to time relative to the date of charter for bank i so that t,,, = 0 where is the date of charter for the ith bank. The halance sheet information used in~cor- Kiefer (1988) suggests that the intuition behind the partutl-likelihood approach used here is that, in the absence of any information ahout the baseline hazard, only the order of the durations provides information about the unknown parameters of the model. In both 12 and 13, the instantaneous pt-ohahilitv of failure is normalized by the sum of instantaneous probabilities of failure for all other banks that could have failed at the same time as the ith bank.
Alternatively, one coutd specify a parametric form tor the baseline hazard in equation 9 and maximize the corresponding likelihood function, Although the partial-likelihood approach avoids the need for an arbitrary parametric specification of the baseline hazard, there is a toss of efticiency in the resulting estimates relative to those obtamed by maximizing the tull likelihood. See Etron (1977) tor a discussion ot this efficiency loss.
